On the nature of quantum-chemical entities: the case of electron density

Foundations of Chemistry 25 (1):127-139 (2022)
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Abstract

An Aristotelian philosophy of nature offers an alternative to reduction for the conception of the inter-theoretical relationships between molecular chemistry and quantum mechanics. A basic ingredient for such an approach is an ontology of fundamental causal powers, and this work aims to develop such an ontology by drawing on quantum-chemical entities, particularly, the electron density. This notion is central to the Quantum Theory of Atoms in Molecules, a theory of molecular structure developed by Richard F. W. Bader, which describes molecules and atoms in terms precisely of the electron density. Then, by identifying a philosophical tension in Bader’s discourse about the nature of electron density, the work will analyze this central notion in terms of the categorical/dispositional distinction regarding properties. The central idea is that electron density can be conceived as categorical and dispositional at once, and this very characterization can avoid Bader’s philosophical tension.

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Ramseyan humility.David K. Lewis - 2009 - In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press. pp. 203-222.
From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Philosophy 79 (309):491-494.
Extrinsic properties.David Lewis - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (2):197-200.

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