On Acting Rationally Against One's Best Judgment

Ethics 110 (3):488-513 (2000)
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Abstract

I argue that akrasia is not always significantly irrational. To be more precise, I argue that an agent is sometimes more rational for being akratic then she would have been for being enkratic or strong-willed.

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Nomy Arpaly
Brown University

Citations of this work

Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.
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Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the A Priori.Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (1):1-22.

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