Varieties of Reasons/Motives Internalism

Philosophy Compass 8 (3):210-219 (2013)
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Abstract

Under what conditions do you have a reason to perform some action? Do you only have reason to do what you want to do? Reasons-motives internalism is the appealingly simple view that unless an agent is, or could be, motivated to act in a certain way, he has no normative reason to act in that way. Thus, according to reasons-motives internalism, facts about an individual’s motivational psychology constrain what is rational for that agent to do. This article canvasses several ways of formulating the view and considers some advantages and disadvantages of each.

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Citations of this work

XV—Normative Non-Naturalism and the Problem of Authority.Shamik Dasgupta - 2017 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (3):297-319.
Reasons for action: Internal vs. external.Stephen Finlay & Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Art and Transformation.Antony Aumann - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (4):567-585.
A New Distinction in Metaethics.David DeMatteo - 2019 - A Priori 5 (Spring 2019).

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Slaves of the passions.Mark Andrew Schroeder - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Wise choices, apt feelings: a theory of normative judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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