The Simulation Theory and Explanations that ‘Make Sense of Behavior’

The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 35:20-26 (1998)
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Abstract

Underlying the current debate between simulation theory and theory theory is the assumption that folk psychological explanations of behavior are causal. Simulationists Martin Davies, Tony Stone, and Jane Heal claim that folk psychological explanations are explanations that make sense of another person by citing the thoughts important to the determination of his behavior on a given occasion. I argue that it is unlikely these explanations will be causal. Davis et al. base their claim on the assumption that a certain isomorphism obtains between the cognitive mechanisms of human beings. Investigation into the nature of the isomorphism required reveals that it is of a sort that is unlikely to obtain. I suggest that in order to maintain their challenge to theory theory, simulationists must either motivate and describe a non-causal simulation-based account of folk psychological explanation or else delineate a causal account that attributes a nonessential, heuristic role to simulation.

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