Quasi-truth and defective knowledge in science: a critical examination

Manuscrito 46 (2):122-155 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Quasi-truth (a.k.a. pragmatic truth or partial truth) is typically advanced as a framework accounting for incompleteness and uncertainty in the actual practices of science. Also, it is said to be useful for accommodating cases of inconsistency in science without leading to triviality. In this paper, we argue that the formalism available does not deliver all that is promised. We examine the standard account of quasi-truth in the literature, advanced by da Costa and collaborators in many places, and argue that it cannot legitimately account for incompleteness in science. We shall claim that it conflates paraconsistency and paracompleteness. It also cannot properly account for inconsistencies, because no direct contradiction of the form S ∧ ¬S can be quasi-true according to the framework; contradictions simply have no place in the formalism. Finally, we advance an alternative interpretation of the formalism in terms of dealing with distinct contexts where incompatible information is dealt with. This does not save the original program, but seems to make better sense of the apparatus.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Quasi-truth in quasi-set theory.Otávio Bueno - 2000 - Synthese 125 (1-2):33-53.
Are truth and reference quasi-disquotational?Ray Buchanan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (1):43 - 75.
The Opacity of Truth.Elia Zardini - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):37-54.
‘Portraying’ a Proposition.Mark Textor - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):137-161.
‘Portraying’ a Proposition 1.Mark Textor - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):137-161.
Mathematics, science and ontology.Thomas Tymoczko - 1991 - Synthese 88 (2):201 - 228.
Empiricism, conservativeness, and quasi-truth.Otávio Bueno - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):485.
Self-knowledge and the "inner eye".Cynthia Macdonald - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):83-106.
Quasi Indexicals.Justin Khoo - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):26-53.
Self-Knowledge and the 'Inner Eye'.Cynthia Macdonald - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):83-106.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-09-16

Downloads
40 (#347,838)

6 months
12 (#122,866)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Jonas R. B. Arenhart
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
Décio Krause
Federal University of Santa Catarina

References found in this work

An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is.Graham Priest - 2008 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Doubt truth to be a liar.Graham Priest - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.
An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is.Graham Priest - 2008 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 14 (4):544-545.
Foundations of Set Theory.Abraham Adolf Fraenkel & Yehoshua Bar-Hillel - 1973 - Atlantic Highlands, NJ, USA: Elsevier.
Doubt Truth to Be a Liar.Graham Priest - 2007 - Studia Logica 87 (1):129-134.

View all 26 references / Add more references