Ratio 27 (1):100-114 (2014)
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Moral Rationalism is the view that if an act is morally required then it is what there is most reason to do. It is often assumed that the truth of Moral Rationalism is dependent on some version of The Overridingness Thesis, the view that moral reasons override nonmoral reasons. However, as Douglas Portmore has pointed out, the two can come apart; we can accept Moral Rationalism without accepting any version of The Overridingness Thesis. Nevertheless, The Overridingness Thesis serves as one of two possible explanations for Moral Rationalism. In this paper I will investigate which of these two explanations a moral rationalist should accept. I will argue that when we properly attend to the form of Moral Rationalism supported by the intuitions that motivate the view, we are left with no reason to accept The Overridingness Thesis.
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DOI | 10.1111/rati.12023 |
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References found in this work BETA
The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason*: David Copp.David Copp - 1997 - Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1):86-106.
Moral Overridingness and Moral Subjectivism.Seana Valentine Shiffrin - 1999 - Ethics 109 (4):772-794.
Citations of this work BETA
Why Consequentialism’s "Compelling Idea" Is Not.Paul Hurley - 2017 - Social Theory and Practice 43 (1):29-54.
Moral Rationalism and Demandingness in Kant.Marcel van Ackeren & Martin Sticker - 2018 - Kantian Review 23 (3):407-428.
Morality and Practical Reasons.Douglas W. Portmore - 2021 - Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
What Is the Question to Which Anti-Natalism Is the Answer?Nicholas Smyth - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):1-17.
Aesthetic Judgements and Motivation.Alfred Archer - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (6):1-22.
View all 9 citations / Add more citations
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2013-08-23
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