Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2011-2027 (2016)

Authors
Avery Archer
George Washington University
Abstract
According to the cognitivist strategy, the desire to bring about P provides reasons for intending to bring about P in a way analogous to how perceiving that P provides reasons for believing that P. However, while perceiving P provides reasons for believing P by representing P as true, desiring to bring about P provides reasons for intending to bring about P by representing P as good. This paper offers an argument against this view. My argument proceeds via an appeal to what I call the non-substitutability of perception, the thesis that, given that there is no independent evidence for P, one cannot substitute something that fails to provide reasons with respect to P for the perceptual experience that P, without altering the rational permissibility of believing that P. By contrast, I argue that it is always possible to substitute something that fails to provide reasons for a desire without altering the rational permissibility of an intention based on said desire. I take this to show that a desire does not provide reasons in a way analogous to perceptual experience.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0594-y
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Virtue and Reason.John McDowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-350.
The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons Without Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2007 - Princeton University Press.

View all 46 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Are Desires Beliefs About Normative Reasons?Avery Archer - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (3):236-251.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Rational Significance of Desire.Avery Archer - 2013 - Dissertation, Columbia University
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure and Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.
Desires, Reasons, and Rationality.Joshua Gert - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):319 - 332.
Reason and Desire: The Case of Affective Desires.Attila Tanyi - 2010 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (2):67-89.
The Practical Given.Paul Edward Hurley - 1988 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
Desires, Reasons, and Causes. [REVIEW]Stephen Darwall - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436–443.
The Desires of Others.Berislav Marušić - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (3):385-400.
Desires and Reasons.Alan Goldman - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):291 - 304.
Practical Reasons and Internalism.Hans Vilhelm Hansen - 1990 - Dissertation, Wayne State University
Normative Handlungsgründe.Peter Schaber - 1999 - Analyse & Kritik 21 (1):25-40.
Non-Contingent Reasons.Crystal Thorpe - 2004 - Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (2):159-169.
The Humean Theory of Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 195--219.
Reason Internalism.Alan H. Goldman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):505 - 533.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-11-12

Total views
187 ( #61,757 of 2,499,615 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #118,163 of 2,499,615 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes