Abstract

The primary objective of this thesis is to provide an account of productive imagination in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason using Heidegger's interpretation in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Kant's account of productive imagination largely remains in the context of his own project to establish the conditions for the possibility of experience which can ground a theory of knowledge. Thus, Kant's project can largely be read as a work of epistemology leaving an account of experience that is limited to knowledge of empirical objects. Therefore, in turning to Heidegger, I seek to provide an account of experience in the Critique that is not merely epistemic. Rather, in focusing on productive imagination in the Critique, as Heidegger has, one can obtain an account of experience that is revelatory of human finitude. Therefore, the thesis proceeds as follows. First, I offer an introduction providing proper context for the project. In Chapter 1, I offer a reading of both the A and B deductions from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in order to establish the role and limits of productive imagination. Chapters 2 and 3 follow Heidegger through a large section of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics in order to highlight the role of productive imagination and to move beyond the limits present in Kant's account. Lastly, I offer a conclusion