Merleau-Ponty's Theory of Preconceptual Generalities and Concept Formation
Abstract
In this paper, I provide an explication and defense of Merleau-Ponty’s theory of concept
formation. I argue that at the core of this theory is a distinction between concepts proper and the kinds
of generalities characteristic of perceptual experience, which I call “pre-conceptual generalities.”
According to Merleau-Ponty, concepts are developed through a two-stage process: first, the
establishment of such pre-conceptual generalities, and second, the clarification of these generalities into
concepts. I provide phenomenological evidence for the existence of pre-conceptual generalities and
explain how they can serve to ground concept formation. To motivate Merleau-Ponty’s account, I
consider objections raised by Husserl, Cassirer, and Sellars to the classical philosophical account of
empirical concept formation, abstraction. I show that Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between concepts
and pre-conceptual generalities provides a philosophically viable account of the formation of empirical
concepts while avoiding the problems faced by accounts that rely on abstraction.