Grounded Consequence for Defeasible Logic

New York: Cambridge University Press (2005)
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Abstract

This is a title on the foundations of defeasible logic, which explores the formal properties of everyday reasoning patterns whereby people jump to conclusions, reserving the right to retract them in the light of further information. Although technical in nature the book contains sections that outline basic issues by means of intuitive and simple examples. This book is primarily targeted at philosophers interested in the foundations of defeasible logic, logicians, and specialists in artificial intelligence and theoretical computer science.

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G. Aldo Antonelli
University of California, Davis

Citations of this work

Ideal Reasoners don’t Believe in Zombies.Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2017 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 21 (1):41-59.
Human Rationality Challenges Universal Logic.Brian R. Gaines - 2010 - Logica Universalis 4 (2):163-205.
Modeling Deep Disagreement in Default Logic.Frederik J. Andersen - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Logic.

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