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Unconscious vision and executive control: How unconscious processing and conscious action control interact
Consciousness and Cognition 27:268-287 (2014)
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Citations of this work
Agential capacities: a capacity to guide.Denis Buehler - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):21-47.
Fame in the predictive brain: a deflationary approach to explaining consciousness in the prediction error minimization framework.Krzysztof Dołęga & Joe E. Dewhurst - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7781-7806.
Learning rapidly about the relevance of visual cues requires conscious awareness.Eoin Travers, Chris D. Frith & Nicholas Shea - 2018 - Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 71 (8):1698–1713.
The semantic origin of unconscious priming: Behavioral and event-related potential evidence during category congruency priming from strongly and weakly related masked words.Juan J. Ortells, Markus Kiefer, Alejandro Castillo, Montserrat Megías & Alejandro Morillas - 2016 - Cognition 146 (C):143-157.
Neural mechanisms of response priming do not support veridical unconscious processing.Iris A. Schnepf, Florian Friedrich, Christian Hepting, Sascha Meyen & Volker H. Franz - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 102 (C):103348.
References found in this work
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Perceptual symbol systems.Lawrence W. Barsalou - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):577-660.
Controlled and automatic human information processing: Perceptual learning, automatic attending, and a general theory.Richard M. Shiffrin & Walter Schneider - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (2):128-90.
Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: Basic evidence and a workspace framework.Stanislas Dehaene & Lionel Naccache - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):1-37.
Attention and cognitive control.Michael I. Posner & C. R. R. Snyder - 1975 - In Robert L. Solso (ed.), Information Processing and Cognition: The Loyola Symposium. Lawrence Erlbaum.
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