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Obligation, free choice, and the logic of weakest permissions
Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):807-827 (2015)
Abstract
We introduce a new understanding of deontic modals that we callobligations as weakest permissions. We argue for its philosophical plausibility, study its expressive power in neighborhood models, provide a complete Hilbert-style axiom system for it and show that it can be extended and applied to practical norms in decision and game theory.Author Profiles
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Citations of this work
From Oughts to Goals: A Logic for Enkrasia.Dominik Klein & Alessandra Marra - 2020 - Studia Logica 108 (1):85-128.
“That Will Do”: Logics of Deontic Necessity and Sufficiency.Frederik Van De Putte - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (3):473-511.
Free choice permission, legitimization and relating semantics.Daniela Glavaničová, Tomasz Jarmużek, Mateusz Klonowski & Piotr Kulicki - forthcoming - Logic Journal of the IGPL.
Connecting Actions and States in Deontic Logic.Piotr Kulicki & Robert Trypuz - 2017 - Studia Logica 105 (5):915-942.
Intuitionistic Non-normal Modal Logics: A General Framework.Tiziano Dalmonte, Charles Grellois & Nicola Olivetti - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (5):833-882.
References found in this work
Circumscription — A Form of Non-Monotonic Reasoning.John McCarthy - 1980 - Artificial Intelligence 13 (1-2):27–39.
Facing the Future: Agents and Choices in Our Indeterminist World.Nuel Belnap, Michael Perloff & Ming Xu - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):660-662.
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