Drawing the Line: Ratonal Cognitive Therapy, Information, and Boundary Issues
Abstract
It has been claimed that cognitive therapists endorse sets of uplifting beliefs BECAUSE the client feels better believing them: not because
they lead towards greater verisimilitude, a purported cognitivist‟s hallmark of rational choice. Since the therapist asks us to choose sets of
beliefs that interpret evidence on the basis of grater individual happiness (all other things being equal), this suggests that the basis of
choice goes beyond rationality. I contend that the case against the rationality of cognitive therapy is not made if one allows a broadening
of what to count as rational cognitive therapy. The rationality of therapy consist in how well it achieves its goal. My claim is that at least
one goal is, or ought to be, greater information value of the client‟ dialogues. Among other things, information values encode affect.
Understanding reason in this way effectively transforms our understanding of rationality in a way that may be incommensurable with the
standard view. If incommensurable, there is no way to discover that we are still talking about the same thing. So, a challenge for this
competing view is to say on what basis the term cognitive therapy may be projectable. I identify some constraints on this project and
sketch a possible solution.