Why don't we trust moral testimony?

Mind and Language 35 (4):456-474 (2020)
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Abstract

Is there a problem with believing based on moral testimony? The intuition that there is a problem is a starting point for much research on moral testimony. To arbitrate between various attempts to account for intuitions about moral testimony, we need to know the exact nature of those intuitions. The current study investigates this empirically. The study confirms an asymmetry in the way we think about testimony about moral and descriptive matters and explores the extent to which this asymmetry is explained by different metaphysical beliefs about the relevant domains, or beliefs about the relative background levels of deception or disagreement.

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James Andow
University of Manchester

Citations of this work

Extracting fictional truth from unreliable sources.Emar Maier & Merel Semeijn - 2021 - In Emar Maier & Andreas Stokke, The Language of Fiction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Experimental philosophy of aesthetics.Florian Cova - 2023 - In Alexander Max Bauer & Stephan Kornmesser, The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.

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References found in this work

In defense of moral testimony.Paulina Sliwa - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):175-195.
A Defense of Moral Deference.David Enoch - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (5):229-258.
Second-Hand Moral Knowledge.Karen Jones - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):55.

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