Ratio 29 (4):378-394 (2016)

Authors
Henrik Andersson
Lund University
Abstract
Recently a lot has been written on the topic of value incomparability. While there is disagreement on how we are to understand incomparability, most seem to accept Ruth Chang's claim that all comparisons must proceed in some specific respect. Call this the Requirement for Specification. Interestingly, even though most seem to accept this requirement, next to nothing has been written on it. In this paper I focus on the requirement and discuss two different but related topics. First, an important observation is made: as it turns out, the requirement plays an important explanatory role for the thesis that incomparability is to be understood in terms of vagueness. Second, I consider what is entailed by the Requirement for Specification. There is a general worry that the requirement entails that there is no such thing as goodness simpliciter. The line of thought is that if we always must specify in which way something is e.g., better than something else, then perhaps things cannot be better simpliciter. And if there is no such thing as betterness-simpliciter, then can there be such a thing as goodness simpliciter? Finally, I consider how an answer to this question affects the view that incomparability is vagueness.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/rati.12142
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,714
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Reasons and Normativity.Jakob Green Werkmäster - 2019 - Dissertation, Lund University

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

In Defence of Good Simpliciter.Richard Rowland - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1371-1391.
Reasons as the Unity Among the Varieties of Goodness.Richard Rowland - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):n/a-n/a.
Value Incomparability and Indeterminacy.Cristian Constantinescu - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):57-70.
Real Knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1983 - Synthese 55 (2):143 - 164.
Frege's View on Vagueness.Marco Ruffino - 2003 - Manuscrito 26 (2):253-277.
Vagueness, Incomparability, and the Collapsing Principle.Erik Carlson - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):449-463.
Value Incomparability and Incommensurability.Ruth Chang - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press.
The Small Improvement Argument.Nicolas Espinoza - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):127 - 139.
Meta‐Ethical Realism with Good of a Kind.Reid D. Blackman - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):273-292.
Ectoplasm Earth.Justin Tiehen - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):167-185.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-11-10

Total views
38 ( #289,087 of 2,462,719 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #449,387 of 2,462,719 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes