Intuitions, Disagreement and Referential Pluralism

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):223-239 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Mallon, Machery, Nichols and Stich (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79: 332–356, 2009) argue that the use of intuitions in the philosophy of reference is problematic as recent studies show intuitions about reference vary both within and between cultures. I use some ideas from the recent literature on disagreement and truth relativism to shed light on the debate concerning the appropriate reaction to these studies. Mallon et al. argue that variation is problematic because if one tries to use intuitions which vary to find the correct theory of reference one will end up endorsing an absurd position: referential pluralism. I argue that there is hope for intuition-based philosophy of reference. One can avoid endorsing referential pluralism (as Mallon et al. understand it). Furthermore, referential pluralism may not be so absurd after all

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-11-09

Downloads
697 (#21,317)

6 months
90 (#40,810)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

James Andow
University of Manchester

Citations of this work

Intuitions.James Andow - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):232-246.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.
Judgement and justification.William G. Lycan - 1988 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
“How to Be a Moral Realist.Richard Boyd - 1988 - In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. pp. 181-228.

View all 58 references / Add more references