Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6):642-643 (2008)

Abstract
Rips et al. claim that the principles underlying the structure of natural numbers cannot be inferred from interactions with the physical world. However, in their target article they failed to consider an important source of interaction: finger counting. Here, we show that finger counting satisfies all the conditions required for allowing the concept of numbers to emerge from sensorimotor experience through a bottom-up process
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X08005578
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