Differentiating between different forms of moral obligations

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43:e57 (2020)
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Abstract

We argue that Tomasello's account overlooks important psychological distinctions between how humans judge different types of moral obligations, such as prescriptive obligations (i.e., what oneshoulddo) and proscriptive obligations (i.e., what oneshould notdo). Specifically, evaluating these different types of obligations rests on different psychological inputs and has distinct downstream consequences for judgments of moral character.

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David Pizarro
Cornell University

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