Can Every Option Be Rationally Impermissible?

Erkenntnis 86 (6):1309-1317 (2019)
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Abstract

Moving from simple to increasingly sophisticated candidate cases, I argue against the idea that there can be cases in which, due to no fault of the agent or to any ambiguity regarding how things will go depending on which option is selected, all the options available to an agent are rationally impermissible. Whether there are cases that fit this bill—qualifying as what I will label no-fault-or-ambiguity rational dilemmas—depends on the characteristics of conclusive reasons. My reasoning leads me to the view that a key feature of conclusive reasons is that they capture or ground overall assessments that are relationally significant. I then argue that, while this view does not itself conflict with the most sophisticated candidate cases of purported dilemmas of the relevant sort, following the spirit of the view does lead to a conclusion that blocks counting even these cases as ones in which there is a conclusive reason against every available option. My conclusion is that there is no solid basis for the view that there are cases of no-fault-or-ambiguity rational dilemmas.

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Chrisoula Andreou
University of Utah

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Agency and deontic logic.John Horty - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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