Consequentialism and Robust Goods

Utilitas 31 (3):334-342 (2019)
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In this article, I critique the moral theory developed in Philip Pettit's The Robust Demands of the Good: Ethics with Attachment, Virtue, and Respect. Pettit's theory, which I label Robust-Goods Consequentialism, aims to avoid the problems but retain the attractive features of traditional consequentialist theories. The distinctive feature of Robust-Goods Consequentialism is a value theory that attempts to accommodate what Pettit calls rich goods: certain moral phenomena that can be categorized under the headings of attachment, virtue and respect. I argue that Robust-Goods Consequentialism fails because it implies very implausible value judgements.



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Vuko Andrić
Linkoping University

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