Abstract

This present paper seeks to show Avicenna’s view on the truthfulness and falsity of the generally accepted premises and look for a certain type of these premises which can be qualified as truth and false. Given Avicenna’s comments on basing rules of dialectics on submission, reputation and invalidity of dialectical preliminaries and generally accepted premises according to truth, as well as his other specifications about the truthfulness and falsity of the generally accepted premises, it can be concluded that his view on the truthfulness and falsity of well-known views is non-conditioned. It seems that truthfulness and falsity among different types of the generally accepted premises data is the attribution of associate to the moral type of generally accepted premises, that super sensual world will be as the actuality of the generally accepted moral propositions, and that religion is considered as the criterion for the truth of these propositions. Otherwise, these views will be variable and relative like other well-known ones and thus the finality of the Holy Prophet and the purpose of his mission will be called into doubt and questioned. The justification of the truthfulness and falsity of the generally accepted premises is also possible on the basis of the theories of pragmatism and coherence.