On Two Alleged Conflicts Between Divine Attributes

Faith and Philosophy 19 (1):47-57 (2002)
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Abstract

Some argue that God’s omnipotence and moral perfection prevent God from being afraid and having evil desires and thus from understanding such states—which contradicts God’s omniscience. But, I argue, God could acquire such understanding indirectly, either by (i) perceiving the mental states of imperfect creatures, (ii) imaginatively combining the components of mental states with which God could be acquainted, or (iii) having false memory traces of such states. (i)–(iii) are consistent with the principal divine attributes.

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Torin Alter
University of Alabama

Citations of this work

Phenomenal knowledge without experience.Torin Alter - 2008 - In Edmond Wright (ed.), The case for qualia. MIT Press. pp. 247.
Omniscience and Worthiness of Worship.Wesley D. Cray - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (2):147-153.
Does God Know What It's Like Not to Know?Rob Lovering - 2013 - Religious Studies 49 (1):85-99.
God’s Knowledge of Other Minds.Dan O'Brien - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1):17--34.
Is God a zombie? Divine consciousness and omnipresence.Raphaël Millière - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 75 (1):38-54.

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References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Consciousness Explained.William G. Lycan - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):424.

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