Abstract

Kulvicki’s goal is to give a representationalist account of what it’s like to see a property that is “fully externalist about perceptual representation” (p. 1) and yet accommodates a certain “internalist intuition” (p. 4), which he describes as follows: “something about what it is like to see a property is internally determined, dependent only on the way one is built from the skin in” (p. 3). He illustrates this intuition with an inverted spectrum case and the manifest-image problem. On his view, there’s an apparent conflict between the intuition and representationalism. That’s because, on representationalism, “what it is like to see a shade of color can be exhaustively explained in terms of what is perceptually represented” (p. 1) and, he claims, “all representational facts are externally determined” (p. 4). In short, if what it’s like is partly internally determined, then how can it be fully explained in terms of externally determined representational facts?