Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):307 - 322 (2003)

Authors
Marc Alspector-Kelly
Western Michigan University
Abstract
Faced with interminable combat over some piece of philosophical terrain, someone will inevitably suggest that the contested ground is nothing more than a philosophically manufactured mirage that is therefore not worth fighting for. Arthur Fine has long advocated such a response—the ‘Natural Ontological Attitude,’ or NOA—to the realism debate in the philosophy of science. Notwithstanding the prima facie incompatibility between the realist’s and anti-realist’s positions, Fine suggests that there is in fact enough common ground for NOA to stand on its own as a minimal alternative, one that enjoys the advantage of being free of the philosophical burdens of its overweight contenders.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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ISBN(s) 0045-5091
DOI 10.1080/00455091.2003.10716545
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References found in this work BETA

Science without numbers, A Defence of Nominalism.Hartry Field - 1980 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 171 (4):502-503.
Piecemeal Realism.Arthur Fine - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (1-2):79 - 96.
Noa's Ark--Fine for Realism.Alan Musgrave - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 39 (157):383-398.
Scientific Realism.John Worrall - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (152):370-376.

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Citations of this work BETA

Qual o Argumento Para a Atitude Ontológica Natural?Bruno Malavolta E. Silva - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (2):175-205.

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