Un analisis de la “res cogitans” (an analysis of “res cogitans”)

Theoria 12 (2):281-292 (1997)
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Abstract

EI tratamiento que hace Descartes deI ‘yo pienso-existo’, lejos de todo proceder inferencial, nos muestra la condición propia de un pensamiento que es “res cogitans”: mi ‘asistir a’ como condición originaria de la fuerza de realidad que soy. Así, el conocimiento que tengo de mí como pensamiento es prejudicativo: no necesita afirmación alguna, sino que expresa prevolitivamente el ser-siendo, o acto, que soy como pensamiento, y que no se extiende a mi cuerpo. The treatment Deseartes does of ‘I think - I exist’ far from any inference, shows the conditioning which is proper of a “res cogitans” thought: my ‘attendance to’ as the originary conditioning of the strength of reality which I am. Thus, the Knowledge I have of myself as thought is prejudicative: it needs no affirmation but it expresses prevolitionally the ‘to be-being’, or act, that I am as thought and which does not extend to my body

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