Science and idealism

Philosophy of Science 40 (2):242-254 (1973)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this essay it is argued that (1) if the process of scientific inquiry were to continue foreever, then science would ultimately terminate in the acceptance of a single theoretical framework better than all conceivable others, and (2) there is some evidence in favor of the view that science will continue unto eternity but no evidence in favor of the contrary view. In arguing for claim (1) it is claimed that if we are to understand the sense in which science is progressive we must mean either that science progresses by approximating a final goal which, given an infinite process, will be attained, or that science progresses simply in the sense of expanding a body of funded knowledge such that, given an infinite process, the body of funded knowledge expands ad infinitum. That the second member of this disjunct is false and that the first cannot be shown to be false follows largely from a discussion and rejection of all available arguments (five) against the hypothesis proposed in (1). Further, an argument provided by Peirce (and suitably supplemented) provides additional positive evidence for the truth of the first member. No such argument exists for the truth of the second member. In arguing for claim (2) it is held that evidence in favor of a belief can be purchased by the positive moral value likely to occur as a result of accepting the beliefs, and that there is at least one moral value which accrues to the belief that inquiry will continue forever but which does not accrue to the belief that inquiry will not continue forever. In short, while there is no systematic evidence for or against the view that inquiry will continue forever, we have the right (and duty) to believe that inquiry will continue forever but we do not have the right (and duty) to believe the contrary

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,934

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Peirce on Inquiry and Truth.Thomas Edward Keith - 2001 - Dissertation, The Claremont Graduate University
Truth and the End of Inquiry. [REVIEW]R. Almeder - 1992 - Review of Metaphysics 45 (4):874-875.
Science and idealism.Maurice Campbell Cornforth - 1947 - New York,: International Publishers.
Science and idealism.Hugo Münsterberg - 1906 - Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co..
Science and Idealism. [REVIEW]W. P. Montague - 1907 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 4 (6):161-163.
Science versus idealism.Maurice Campbell Cornforth - 1946 - London,: Lawrence & Wishart.
Evolutionary debunking arguments, moral knowledge and underdetermination.Christopher Noonan - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Peirce, Moral Cognitivism, and the Development of Character.Aaron Massecar - 2014 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 50 (1):139.
Science and Idealism.Hugo Munsterberg - 1907 - Philosophical Review 16:95.
The Fixation of Belief.C. S. Peirce - 1877 - Popular Science Monthly 12 (1):1-15.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
53 (#416,011)

6 months
15 (#222,143)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Scientific progress.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1980 - Synthese 45 (3):427 - 462.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
Conjectures and Refutations.Karl Popper - 1963 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):159-168.
The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.
Science and Subjectivity.Israel Scheffler - 1979 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 169 (1):119-123.
Observation and Interpretation.Stephen Toulmin - 1959 - Philosophical Quarterly 9 (36):285-286.

View all 6 references / Add more references