Perception, Non-Propositional Content and the Justification of Perceptual Judgments

Metaphysica 15 (1):1-23 (2014)
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Abstract

It is often argued that for a perceptual experience to be able to justify perceptual judgments, the perceptual experience must have a propositional content. For, it is claimed, only propositions can bear logical relations such as implication to each other. In this paper, this claim is challenged. It is argued that whereas perceptions and judgments both have intentional content, their contents have different structures. Perceptual content does not have a propositional structure. Perceptions and judgments can nevertheless have the same cognitive significance. So the veridicality of a certain perceptual experience, can imply the truth of certain propositions. Consequently, perceptions can have non-propositional content, but even so justify perceptual judgments which have a propositional structure.

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Jan Almäng
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Citations of this work

The Normative Force of Perceptual Justification.Arnaud Dewalque - 2015 - In Maxime Doyon & Thiemo Breyer (eds.), Normativity in Perception. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 178-195.
Metaphor and mental shortcuts.Elly Ifantidou & Anna Piata - 2021 - Pragmatics and Cognition 28 (2):299-320.

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References found in this work

Nonconceptual content and the "space of reasons".Richard G. Heck - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):483-523.
Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?Tim Crane - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469.
Determinables as Universals.Ingvar Johansson - 2000 - The Monist 83 (1):101-121.
Russellian Propositions and Properties.Jan Almäng - 2012 - Metaphysica 13 (1):7-25.

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