On Infinitely Improving Worlds

Philo 8 (1):38-46 (2005)
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Abstract

William Rowe argues that an essentially perfectly good being could not actualize a world unless there is no better world it could actualize instead. According to Rowe’s Argument from Improvability, if there is an infinite series of ever-improving and actualizable worlds then a perfect being could actualize exactly none of them. I argue that there is no reason to believe Rowe’s argument is sound. It therefore presents no important objection to theism.

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Mike Almeida
University of Texas at San Antonio

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