On a Columnar Self: Two Senses of Expressing Partisanship

Res Publica 30 (3):509-527 (2024)
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Abstract

According to the partisan cheerleading view, numerous political disagreements that appear to be genuine are not authentic disputes, because partisans _deliberately_ misreport their beliefs to show support for their parties. Recently, three arguments have been put forth to support this view. First, contemporary democracies are characterized by affective rather than ideological polarization. Second, financial incentives indicate that partisans often deliberately misreport their beliefs to express their attitudes. Third, partisans have inconsistent and unstable political beliefs, so we should not take these attitudes seriously. In this paper, I examine these arguments and present an alternative view, which I call the partisan conviction view. According to it, partisans are not necessarily insincere in their political judgments, and they are in genuine disagreement.

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Manuel Almagro Holgado
Universitat de Valencia

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Deep Agreements.Michael D. Baumtrog - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.

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