Chalmers’ Argument from Relativity

Erkenntnis 87 (4):2047-2052 (2020)
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Abstract

David Chalmers has recently argued that Relativity Theory supports the notion that shapes are Twin-Earthable. In this paper this argument is challenged. I reconstruct the argument in five steps where the last step is the conclusion. I proceed to argue that one step in the argument can be interpreted in two different ways. The problem is that on the first interpretation of the step, the conclusion does not follow. And on the second interpretation of the step, it contradicts a previous step in the argument. I conclude that Relativity Theory does not entail that phenomenal and functional twins could represent different shapes.

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Jan Almäng
NLA Høgskolen

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References found in this work

Constructing the World.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Structuralism as a Response to Skepticism.David J. Chalmers - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (12):625-660.
Redefining 'intrinsic'.David Lewis - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):381-398.

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