Abstract

This article raises the issue of the extent to which a single nation can develop a “national agricultural policy,” pursuing internal goals in agrarian development, goals that vary significantly from those of other industrialized countries. What are the conflicts arising from such a policy and how do these conflicts interfere with the general agricultural crisis of these countries? The Norwegian case is explored as an example of a blend of social-democratic and center-populist agricultural policies. The decision in 1975 by the Norwegian Parliament to establish the income level of farmers at the same level as workers is seen as an experiment. As agricultural policy, this new departure represented a deviation from the earlier policies of rationalization. The Social Democrats developed their new position as a result of internal and external pressure. A series of reforms financed by the new state incomes from oil production were undertaken, of which income equalization and a farm relief service were the most important. Most Norwegian farmers speak of the reform years as “the good years of escalation.” Equity was reached in 1982, but nevertheless several problems emerged: 1) the escalation of subsidized incomes led to overproduction and decreasing incomes from the market (after 1982), 2) the large budgetary transfers to agriculture caused a legitimation crisis, fueling the constituency of the right-wing Progress Party, 3) the large subsidies to agriculture contributed to the fiscal crisis of the state, 4) the problems mentioned above, contributed to the general crisis of the Norwegian Social Democracy which finds itself with dwindling support. The likely outcome of the present Norwegian farm crisis is the implementation of an agricultural policy that will protect the most vulnerable sector and open the more competitive sector to market forces