Philosophy of Science 34 (3):260-272 (1967)

Philosophers have long believed that if the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles were logically true, there would be no problem of individuation. I show (a) that if spatial relations are, as seems plausible, of such a nature that it makes no sense to say of one thing that it is related to itself, then the Principle is a logical truth, asserting that a certain kind of state of affairs is impossible because the kind of sentence purporting to express it is ill-formed and (b) that even if the Principle were such a truth the problem of individuation would remain. I then examine some of what Leibniz and Wittgenstein have said about the notions of individuation, difference and nonidentity
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DOI 10.1086/288157
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References found in this work BETA

Logic and Reality.Gustav Bergmann - 1964 - Foundations of Language 3 (4):429-432.
Another Look at Bare Particulars.Edwin B. Allaire - 1965 - Philosophical Studies 16 (1-2):16 - 21.
Russell's Examination of Leibniz Examined.Gustav Bergmann - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (3):175-203.

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