Dialectica 65 (2):153-176 (2011)

Authors
Keith Allen
University of York
Abstract
According to naïve realist (or primitivist) theories of colour, colours are sui generis mind-independent properties. The question that I consider in this paper is the relationship of naïve realism to what Mark Johnston calls Revelation, the thesis that the essential nature of colour is fully revealed in a standard visual experience. In the first part of the paper, I argue that if naïve realism is true, then Revelation is false. In the second part of the paper, I defend naïve realism against a number of objections
Keywords Colour  Primitivism  Naive Realism  Revelation
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01261.x
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Revelation and Phenomenal Relations.Antonin Broi - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):22-42.
Folk Core Beliefs About Color.Pendaran Roberts & Kelly Ann Schmidtke - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):849-869.
Color.Barry Maund - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Another Look at Color Primitivism.Pendaran Roberts - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2489-2506.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

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