On Foundationalism [Book Review]

Review of Metaphysics 59 (1):196-198 (2005)
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Abstract

Metaphysical realism, as Rockmore defines it, is the claim that "under the proper conditions it is possible to know independent objects and the world as it is". Its canonical version is Platonic realism, which includes the ontological claim that this objective reality is a "permanent ahistorical matrix or framework". Foundationalism is an epistemological strategy for validating the realist claim by identifying something as absolutely true, true "beyond skepticism, hence beyond doubt of any kind", then deducing from it objective "knowledge of the mind-independent real as it is".

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