Free Will and Compatibilism

Abstract

The author mounts a case against the libertarian and hard determinist's thesis that free will is impossible in a deterministic world. He charges incompatibilists with misconstruing ordinary 'free will' talk by overlaying common language with their own metaphysical presuppositions. Through a review of ordinary discourse and recent developments in jurisprudence and the sciences, he draws together the four key factors required for an act to be free. He then puts his 4C theory to work in giving a credible account of how caused human agents 'could have done otherwise'.

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Leslie Allan
La Trobe University

References found in this work

Free Will and Determinism.Bernard Berofsky (ed.) - 1966 - New York,: Harper & Row.

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