Why Shouldn't I Lie? Ten Preliminaries

Ethical Record 116 (10):6-10 (2011)
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Abstract

I introduce the reader to the character and complexity of lying, in terms of how the lie should be defined as a particular type of intentionally deceptive utterance, whether or not the deceiver succeeded in that aim, and examine how we might usefully avoid prejudging the justifiability of the lying utterance when compared to alternative forms of intentional deception and the overall outcome sought.

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2011-11-18

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Shahrar Ali
University College London

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The Moral Presumption Against Lying.Joseph Kupfer - 1982 - Review of Metaphysics 36 (1):103 - 126.

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