Culpable Control or Moral Concepts?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):330-331 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Knobe argues in his target article that asymmetries in intentionality judgments can be explained by the view that concepts such as intentionality are suffused with moral considerations. We believe that the “culpable control” model of blame can account both for Knobe's side effect findings and for findings that do not involve side effects.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,330

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Culpable Control and Deviant Causal Chains.Mark Alicke & David Rose - 2012 - Personality and Social Psychology Compass 6 (10):723-735.
Effects of moral cognition on judgments of intentionality.Jennifer Nado - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):709-731.
Knobe, Side Effects, and the Morally Good Business.Andy Wible - 2008 - Journal of Business Ethics 85 (S1):173 - 178.
Control, intentional action, and moral responsibility.Frank Hindriks - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):787 - 801.
Blame, Badness, and Intentional Action: A Reply to Knobe and Mendlow.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):259-269.
Can Substitution Inferences Explain the Knobe Effect?Corey McGrath - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):667-679.
Tracing Culpable Ignorance.Rik Peels - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (4):575-582.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-11-28

Downloads
138 (#121,226)

6 months
3 (#425,298)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

David Rose
Goldsmiths College, University of London
David Rose
Stanford University

References found in this work

Add more references