Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):15-27 (2007)

Abstract
This paper looks closely at previously enunciated axioms that specifically include phenomenology as the sense of a self in a perceptual world. This, we suggest, is an appropriate way of doing science on a first-person phenomenon. The axioms break consciousness down into five key components: presence, imagination, attention, volition and emotions. The paper examines anew the mechanism of each and how they interact to give a single sensation. An abstract architecture, the Kernel Architecture, is introduced as a starting point for building computational models. The thrust of the paper is to relate the axioms to the kernel architecture and indicate that this opens a way of discussing some first-person issues: tests for consciousness, animal consciousness and Higher Order Thought
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Progress in Machine Consciousness.David Gamez - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):887-910.
Emotional Cognitive Steps Towards Consciousness.Will N. Browne & Richard J. Hussey - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (2):203-211.
World-Related Integrated Information: Enactivist and Phenomenal Perspectives.Mike Beaton & Igor Aleksander - 2012 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (2):439-455.

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