Abstract

Conceptual metaphor theory showed, from embodiment, the importance of metaphor as a cognitive process. This influential theory assumes the existence of primitive but powerful mental structures called image schemas. In this paper, we conduct a critical inquiry about these structures from the developmental perspective of the pragmatics of the object and show they have serious problems. Taking the CONTAINER image schema as a case, we discuss the plausibility of image schemas in early childhood. We suggest that children do not interact with objects as if a basic and generic CONTAINER cognitive structure preexisted. Instead, in everyday life, they use “container” objects to fulfill very different functions. As object function is construed by children's participation in triadic child-adult-object experiences through semiotic mediation, we propose image schemas are not natural or direct, do not exist in early childhood, and are a developmental, pragmatic, and cultural product. As empirical illustration, we analyze a child-mother-objects interaction at home.