Abstract

This paper explores a notion of “the strong version” of a sentential logic S, initially defined in terms of the notion of a Leibniz filter, and shown to coincide with the logic determined by the matrices of S whose filter is the least S-filter in the algebra of the matrix. The paper makes a general study of this notion, which appears to unify under an abstract framework the relationships between many pairs of logics in the literature. The paradigmatic examples are the local and the global consequences associated with a normal modal logic, and the logics preserving degrees of truth and preserving truth associated with certain substructural and many-valued logics. For protoalgebraic logics the results in the paper coincide with those obtained by two of the authors in 2001, so the main novelty of the approach is its suitability for all kinds of logics. The paper also studies three kinds of definability of the Leibniz filters, and their consequences for the determination of the strong version. In a second part of the paper several case studies are developed, comprising positive modal logic, Dunn–Belnap’s four-valued logic, the large family of substructural logics, and some relevance logics.