Public Health Ethics 9 (1):55-64 (2016)

Andreas Albertsen
Aarhus University
Should we grant a fresh start to those who come to regret their past lifestyle choices? A negative response to this question can be located in the luck egalitarian literature. As a responsibility-sensitive theory of justice, luck egalitarianism considers it just that people’s relative positions reflect their past choices, including those they regret. In a recent article, Vansteenkiste, Devooght and Schokkaert argue against the luck egalitarian view, maintaining instead that those who regret their past choices in health are disadvantaged in a relevant way and should receive compensation. Employing the ideal that people should be made equal as measured by equivalent resources, they purport to show the fairness of such an arrangement through a hypothetical scenario. Relaxing the implicit assumptions of this scenario brings forth several unattractive consequences of the fresh-start idea. The main problem is that in striving to ensure that people’s past choices do not affect their own opportunities, the authors must accept that these choices put heavy strains on the opportunities available to other people. Furthermore, the luck egalitarian position is more compelling than they admit
Keywords personal responsibility in health  luck egalitarianism  fresh starts
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DOI 10.1093/phe/phv020
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References found in this work BETA

What is the Point of Equality.Elizabeth Anderson - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):287-337.
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Equality, Responsibility, and Justice.David V. Axelsen, Juliana Bidadanure & Tim Meijers - 2019 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 22 (3):237-244.

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