Ethics 132 (2):291-321 (2022)

Authors
Farbod Akhlaghi
Cambridge University
Abstract
Derek Parfit defended Non-Realist Cognitivism. It is an open secret that this metaethical theory is often thought at best puzzling and at worst objectionably unclear. Employing truthmaker theory, I provide an account of Non-Realist Cognitivism that dispels charges of objectionable unclarity, clarifies how to assess it, and explains why, if plausible, it would be an attractive theory. I develop concerns that the theory involves cheating into an objection that ultimately reveals Non-Realist Cognitivism faces a dilemma. Whether it can escape demands further attention. In bridging metaethics and the truthmaking literature, I illustrate the importance of greater meta-metaphysical reflection in metaethics.
Keywords Non-Realist Cognitivism  Truthmaking  Meta-Ethics  Derek Parfit  Ontological Cheating
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Reprint years 2021, 2022
DOI 10.1086/716872
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References found in this work BETA

How to Be a Truthmaker Maximalist.Ross P. Cameron - 2008 - Noûs 42 (3):410 - 421.
Moral Supervenience.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):592-615.
Truthmakers.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):186–200.
Truthmakers.Fraser MacBride - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Deflating Deflationary Truthmaking.Jamin Asay & Sam Baron - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):1-21.

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