Understanding the embodiment of perception

APA Proceedings and Addresses 79 (3):5-25 (2006)
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Abstract

Obviously perception is embodied. After all, if creatures were entirely disembodied, how could physical processes in the environment, such as the propagation of light or sound, be transduced into a neurobiological currency capable of generating experience? Is there, however, any deeper, more subtle sense in which perception is embodied? Perhaps. Alva Nos (2004) theory of enactive perception provides one proposal. Where it is commonly thought that

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Ken Aizawa
Rutgers University - Newark

Citations of this work

Extended Cognition and Functionalism.Mark Sprevak - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (9):503-527.
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The Mark of the Cognitive.Fred Adams & Rebecca Garrison - 2013 - Minds and Machines 23 (3):339-352.
Digital suffering: why it's a problem and how to prevent it.Bradford Saad & Adam Bradley - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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