Abstract

Despite the prominence of the systematicity argument in the debate between Classicists and Connectionists, there is extremely widespread misunderstanding of the nature of the argument. For example, Matthews (1994), has argued that the systematicity argument is a kind of trick, where Niklasson and van Gelder (1994), have claimed that it is obscure. More surprisingly, once one examines the argument carefully, one finds that Fodor, Pylyshyn, and McLaughlin, themselves have not fully understood it. 1 In part as a result of this, many Connectionists who have tried to meet the challenge of explaining the systematicity of thought have been misled about what this challenge involves (e.g. Pollack 1990; Smolensky 1990; Niklasson and van Gelder 1994). I have five principal objectives in this paper. First, I want to respond to those who believe that the systematicity argument is mere obscurity by providing a clear presentation of it. Second, and at the same time, I want to respond to those who believe the argument is mere trickery by showing it to be an instance of a rather familiar form of legitimate scientific reasoning. Third, having seen what sort of reasoning is involved in the argument, I wish to indicate how certain attempts to meet the challenge of systematicity are inadequate. Fourth, having seen the explanatory standard set by the systematicity argument, I want to indicate how even Fodor, Pylyshyn, and McLaughlin, fail to see how Classicism fails to meet the standard. Fifth, and finally, I wish to indicate what consequences the foregoing considerations have for the prospects of Classicism and Connectionism.