The separation argument and the logical impossibility of intrinsically discrete reality

Abstract

One of the oldest questions in science and philosophy is whether reality is fundamentally discrete, or fundamentally continuous. In this short essay I show that this question should first be classified into two main categories. 1) Intrinsic existence, 2) Behavioral existence. I show that the first category should be continuous by definition, while the second category could probably be either continuous or discrete.

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