Una reivindicación de mente y voluntad frente al conductismo lógico de Ryle

Revista de Educación y Desarrollo 42:81-89 (2017)
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Abstract

This article describes four arguments presented Gilbert Ryle in his book The Concept of Mind to argue that the concept of “mind” is a product of the false belief that there is a ghost in the machine, and this ambiguity is analyzed, it causes words as “will” take meaning in ordinary language. Besides the analysis of the arguments, we offer an answer to each of them and, finally, the idea that mind and will form part of the body and have an ontological support, although not possessing a separate existence from the same holding.

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Fabio Morandín-Ahuerma
Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla México

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