Beyond the Categories of Truth

Axiomathes 32 (6):1297-1329 (2021)
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Abstract

In the course of this paper, I shall argue that an absolute ineffable God of Islam is contradictory beyond the ordinary categories (substantive or insubstantive) of truth. In order to demonstrate my thesis, I shall refer to a metaphysical and epistemological inquiry. In virtue of both of these inquires, I shall establish that the contradictory assumption ‘the God of Islam is absolutely ineffable’ cannot be false in a substantive or an insubstantive sense. The metaphysical inquiry shall comprise of two related phases. The first phase includes logical realism and anti-realism, while the second phase includes ontological realism and ontological deflationism. I demonstrate that the contradictory assumption ‘the God of Islam is absolutely ineffable’ cannot be considered false in virtue of these outlooks for different reasons. The epistemological inquiry refers to epistemicism. I demonstrate that although this particular view infers an indeterminate truth-value of the contradictory assumption ‘the God of Islam is absolutely ineffable’, it is incompatible with the notion of an absolute ineffable God of Islam. In light of both these inquires, it will become apparent that the contradictory assumption of an absolute ineffable God of Islam cannot be false in a substantive or insubstantive sense. This is because an absolute ineffable God of Islam transcends beyond these very categories of falsehood and truth.

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Abbas Ahsan
University of Birmingham

References found in this work

Composition, colocation, and metaontology.Karen Bennett - 2009 - In David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 38.
A Survey of Logical Realism.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2021 - Synthese 198 (5):4775-4790.
Grounding Orthodoxy and the Layered Conception.Gabriel Oak Rabin - 2018 - In Ricki Bliss & Graham Priest (eds.), Reality and its Structure: Essays in Fundamentality. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 37-49.
Paradoxes.R. M. Sainsbury - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (2):455-459.
Truth as a Substantive Property.Douglas Edwards - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):279-294.

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