Evidential Decision Theory

Cambridge University Press (2021)
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Abstract

Evidential Decision Theory is a radical theory of rational decision-making. It recommends that instead of thinking about what your decisions *cause*, you should think about what they *reveal*. This Element explains in simple terms why thinking in this way makes a big difference, and argues that doing so makes for *better* decisions. An appendix gives an intuitive explanation of the measure-theoretic foundations of Evidential Decision Theory.

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Arif Ahmed
Cambridge University

Citations of this work

Decision, causality, and predetermination.Boris Kment - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (3):638-670.
Instrumental Divergence.J. Dmitri Gallow - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-27.

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