Meno and the Monist

Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2):157-170 (2013)
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Recent critiques of veritistic value monism, or the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, typically invoke a claim about the surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief, in turn traced back to Plato's Meno. However, to the extent Plato at all defends a surplus claim in the Meno, it differs from that figuring in contemporary discussions with respect to both its scope and the kind of value at issue, and is under closer scrutiny fully compatible with veritistic value monism. Consequently, contrary to what seems to be supposed in the literature, the critics of monism have little to gain from turning to the Meno for support



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Conceptions of Epistemic Value.Timothy Perrine - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):213-231.

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References found in this work

Knowledge in a social world.Alvin I. Goldman - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.
The nature and value of knowledge: three investigations.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock.

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