In Defense of Veritistic Value Monism

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):19-40 (2013)
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Abstract

Recently, veritistic value monism, i.e. the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, has come under attack by pluralist philosophers arguing that it cannot account fully for the domain of epistemic value. However, the relevant arguments fail to establish any such thing. For one thing, there is a presumption of monism due to considerations about axiological parsimony. While such a presumption would be defeated by evidence that the relevant kind of monism cannot account fully for the domain of epistemic value, an examination of the most promising pluralist counterexamples casts serious doubt upon the claim that there is any such evidence

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Citations of this work

Inquiring Minds Want to Improve.Arianna Falbo - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (2).
The ethics of belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Conceptions of Epistemic Value.Timothy Perrine - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):213-231.
Is reliabilism a form of consequentialism?Jeffrey Dunn & Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2):183-194.

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